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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Union Pacific Railroad, 
Petitioner, Supreme Court Case No. 20110326-SC 
(PSC Docket No. 09-888-01) 
v. 
Nature of Proceeding: Appeal 
Utah Department of Transportation; and 
Utah Public Service Commission, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant, Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"), respectfully 
submits this brief in support of its appeal of the Febmary 7, 2011, Report and Order of 
the Public Service Commission. R. 947 - 71. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Sections 63G-4-401 and 78A-3-
102(3)(e)(i) of the Utah Code. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is the railroad-highway grade crossing at approximately 400 North Street, 
Vineyard, Utah, a private crossing that is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
Department of Transportation? R. 955. Whether a crossing is private and thus not 
subject to the jurisdiction of UDOT is a question of law. Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Servs., 2007 UT App 280,\4, 167 P.3d 1102 ("General questions of law include . . . 
rulings concerning an agency's jurisdiction " (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 2001 UT 112,118 ,38 P.3d 291)). The Commission's 
determinations of legal questions are reviewed for correctness. Utah Chapter of Sierra 
Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74,19, 148 P.3d 960. The Commission's 
findings of fact are upheld if they "are supported by substantial evidence." Hegarty v. 
Bd of Oil, Gas, Mining, Dep't of Natural Res., 2002 UT 82, f 17,57 P.3d 1042. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. 
(1) (a) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has 
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of 10 years. 
(b) Dedication to the use of the public under Subsection (1) does not require an 
act of dedication or implied dedication by the property owner. 
(2) The requirement of continuous use under Subsection (1) is satisfied if the use 
is as frequent as the public finds convenient or necessary and may be seasonal or 
follow some other pattern. 
(3) Continuous use as a public thoroughfare under Subsection (1) is interrupted 
only when: 
(a) the regularly established pattern and frequency of public use for the given 
road has actually been interrupted to a degree that reasonably puts the traveling 
public on notice; or 
(b) for interruptions by use of a manned barricade on or after May 10, 2011: 
(i) the person or entity interrupting the continuous use gives not less than 
72 hours advance written notice of the interruption to the highway authority 
having jurisdiction of the highway, street, or road; and 
2 
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(ii) the manned barricade is maintained for at least 24 consecutive hours. 
(4) Installation of gates and posting of no trespassing signs are relevant forms of 
evidence but are not solely determinative of whether an interruption has occurred. 
(5) If the highway authority having jurisdiction of the highway, street, or road 
demands that an interruption cease or that a barrier or barricade blocking public 
access be removed and the property owner accedes to the demand, the attempted 
interruption does not constitute an interruption under Subsection (3). 
(6) (a) The burden of proving dedication under Subsection (1) is on the party 
asserting the dedication. 
(b) The burden of proving interruption under Subsection (3) is on the party 
asserting the interruption. 
(7) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the state in 
accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(8) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary to 
ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances. 
(9) (a) The provisions of this section apply to any claim under this section for 
which a court of competent jurisdiction has not issued a final unappealable 
judgment or order. 
(b) The legislature finds that the application of this section: 
(i) does not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested rights; and 
(ii) clarifies legislative intent in light of Utah Supreme Court rulings in 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 179 P.3d 768 (Utah 2008), Town of Leeds v. 
Prisbrey, 179 P.3d 757 (Utah 2008), and Utah County v. Butler, 179 P.3d 
775 (Utah 2008). 
i 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case, the parties dispute the status of an at-grade railroad crossing located at 
approximately 400 North Street in Vineyard, Utah. The Public Service Commission 
concluded that this was a public crossing subject to UDOT's jurisdiction, and that the 
movement of the road off of the established public right of way effectively moved the 
public right of way to the location of the new road. Union Pacific brings this appeal to 
contest this conclusion because it was based on an erroneous interpretation and 
application of Utah law, and because the crossing as presently located is not public either 
through statutory dedication or by any other means. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
In January 2009 UDOT's Chief Railroad Engineer, Eric Cheng, determined that 
the 400 North crossing was private. R. 953. After objection by Appellees, UDOT 
reversed this determination and found that the crossing was public. Id. at 8. Several 
months after this reversal, UDOT issued a letter stating that the crossing was unsafe, and 
would be temporarily closed. Id, On August 12, 2009, Union Pacific filed a petition for 
relief with the Public Service Commission, arguing that UDOT's determination that the 
crossing was public was contrary to law. Id. at 9. Appellees opposed this petition, 
arguing, among other things, that UDOT did have jurisdiction to determine the status of 
the road crossing Union Pacific's right of way, and that the crossing was a public 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
crossing in spite of the fact that it was moved off of the public right of way. 
The Commission ruled that the "current placement [of the road] has no effect on 
the legal nature of the crossing/' R. 962, and affirmed UDOT's determination that the 
i 
crossing was public based on its determination that the former, publicly dedicated 
crossing located to the south of the current crossing was never officially abandoned. This 
appeal followed to contest the Public Service Commission's conclusion that a public right 
of way can be moved across private property without the need to satisfy statutory 
dedication requirements or exercise the right of eminent domain. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1881 the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, Union Pacific's predecessor, 
acquired a right of way by deed from private property owner Stagg, and this right of way 
is Union Pacific's private property. R. 948. At some point between when the railroad 
acquired the right of way and 1942, a public road was established crossing Union 
Pacific's right of way. R. 948. In 1942 the Utah County Commissioners passed a 
resolution quitclaiming all the land, including roads belonging to the county, located 
within a 1,500 acre area for the construction of a steel plant, now known as the former 
Geneva Steel. R. 567. This resolution vacated the county's claims to all roads 
encompassed within the vacating line. R. 950. The portion of the public road at and 
beyond the east boundary of Union Pacific's right of way was vacated by this resolution. 
R. 949. However, the crossing itself was not vacated. R. 950. This left a railroad 
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crossing that led to the private lands owned by the steel company. R. 949. The Public 
Service Commission (the Commission) found that sometime in the 1970's the road over 
the established public crossing was removed and a new road was constructed that lay 
almost completely off of the established public right of way. R. 951-52. This new road, 
located at what is now approximately 400 North Street in Vineyard, Utah, lay either 
entirely or partially within the land that was vacated by the 1942 resolution, R. 962, while 
the closest edge of the original public right of way was located at least five feet1 below 
the vacation line. R. 950. There is evidence that the county and the steel mill engaged in 
discussions about this removal of the public crossing and construction of a new crossing. 
R. 952. The Commission did not find that construction of the new road was performed 
by any other party other than the steel mill. R. 952. 
From the time the new road was constructed in the 1970's or 80's until the steel 
mill permanently ceased its operations in 2001, the new road was only used by the 
owners of the steel mill and their employees and business invitees to access the steel mill 
parking lot. R. 740. Access through the crossing to the steel mill parking lot was 
controlled by a gate. R. 739. In late 2005, Anderson Geneva acquired the property 
formerly occupied by the steel mill, and maintained a closed gate across the east side of 
the crossing until sometime in 2009. R. 739. 
1
 This number is calculated by subtracting the width of the north half of the road 
(approximately 25 feet) from the width that would be needed for the north half of the 
road to cross over the vacation line (at least 30 feet). This creates the most conservative 
estimate of the distance between the far northern edge of the road and the southern edge 
of the vacation line—five feet. 
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In early 2009 UDOT's Chief Railroad Engineer determined that the intersection of 
the new road and Union Pacific's right of was a private crossing. R. 953. Appellees 
presented to UDOT information that the crossing was categorized as a public crossing in 
the FRA inventory listing. R. 954. Based on this evidence, UDOT reversed its 
determination that the crossing was private, and determined that it was public. R. 954. In 
July of that year, UDOT stated that it had determined the crossing was unsafe, and that it 
would be temporarily closed. R. 954. Both parties requested relief from the 
Commission: Union Pacific from UDOT's determination that the crossing was public, 
and Appellees from UDOT's decision to temporarily close the crossing. 
The Commission affirmed UDOT's determination that the crossing was public, 
reasoning that since there was a former crossing south of the current crossing that was 
never formally vacated, and the current crossing was never formally vacated, it must be a 
public crossing. R. 961. The Commission also determined that UDOT's actions in 
ordering the crossing to be closed without first following its procedures was arbitrary and 
capricious, and that the crossing should be reopened until the proper procedures were 
followed. R.970. 
The tracks at the crossing are active, with freight traffic of about eight to twenty 
trains per day. R. 739. UTA plans to establish a commuter rail in Union Pacific's right 
of way. Once this project is completed it is estimated that there will be an additional 
sixty trains per day of commuter rail traffic. R. 740. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In spite of the fact that the road was relocated off of the public right of way, the 
Commission made the legal conclusion that the public right of way moved with the road, 
onto Union Pacific's private right of way. This conclusion of law should be reversed. 
First, the existence of a public crossing at another location on Union Pacific's private 
right of way does not give UDOT jurisdiction over a separate crossing that lies outside of 
the boundaries of that established public right of way. Second, the crossing is private 
because a new public crossing was not dedicated where 400 North Street currently 
crosses Union Pacific's right of way. Third, since the crossing is private, it is not subject 
to UDOT's sole jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT A 
PUBLIC CROSSING EXISTS AT THE CURRENT LOCATION OF 400 NORTH 
STREET OVER WHICH UDOT HAS JURISDICTION 
a. When the road that crosses Union Pacific's right of way was 
relocated, it ceased to be a public road 
The highway-railroad grade crossing at issue in this case became private when the 
road that crosses Union Pacific's right of way near 400 North Street was relocated off of 
the public right of way in the 1970's. "Both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
prohibit uncompensated takings of private property." Wasatch Cnty v. Okelberry, 2008 
UT 10, f 9, 179 P.3d 768. One exception to this rule is found in Section 72-5-104 of the 
8 
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Utah Code, which provides that a highway becomes dedicated to public use after it has 
been continuously used by the public for ten years. 
However, under that statute, "the public cannot acquire a right by use to pass over 
a tract of land generally, but only in a certain line or way." Lindsay Land & Livestock 
Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah 1929). Deviations in the line of travel after 
dedication may change the identity of a road, and thus require the new road to be 
dedicated to public use independently, unless those variations are "slight deviations 
[made] to avoid encroachments, obstacles, or obstructions upon the road." Id. A 
"claimant may not abandon one . . . right of way and adopt another," Lund v. Wilcox, 97 
P. 33, 35 (Utah 1908), and variations of twenty feet or less can be enough to create a new 
thoroughfare that must be established through proper procedures as a public right of way 
before it can be claimed as such. Id.; see also Vestal v. Young, 82 P. 383, 384 (Cal. 1905) 
(holding that party in possession of easement for purposes of maintaining a ditch may not 
construct new ditch outside area of original easement, even if original ditch was 
destroyed and new ditch is located within twenty feet of original). This is because, "[i]f 
an established right of way may be changed any time it becomes inconvenient for use, or 
even impassable, then there is no limit to the extent of territory that the claimant of a right 
of way may appropriate for such use." Lund, 97 P. at 35. 
This principle is illustrated in Lund v. Wilcox. Id. In that case, a landowner had 
established a road over a portion of his neighbor's land. Id. at 34. This road was 
necessary to allow the landowner to access the public freeway. Id. at 35. After this road 
o 
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was established it was washed out, and the landowner rebuilt it in a somewhat different 
location that still traversed his neighbor's land. Id. at 34. When the neighbor sued to 
prevent the landowner from using her land for this second road, it was found that a 
prescriptive easement in the location of the new road could not be established because 
use of the old road as an easement could not be counted toward the prescriptive period 
necessary to establish an easement in the location of the new road. Id. at 35. This Court 
held that, despite the fact that this ruling would be inconvenient and expensive for the 
landowner, he still had to follow the proper procedures to establish an easement that 
would give him access to his property. Id. at 35-36 ("[W]e know of no law that permits 
[a party to change] the route of travel over another's land without compensation, and 
upon the sole ground that it is both convenient and necessary to do this in order to lose no 
. . . labor or expense . . . . " ) . 
The case now before the Court is strikingly similar to Lund. A public right of way 
was established where the original 400 North Street crossed Union Pacific's right of way. 
After the public crossing was established, the road was moved either entirely or 
substantially off of the established public right of way. However, as in Lund, the 
established public right of way did not move with the road, but remained in the location 
where it had been established, south of where the current 400 North Street crosses Union 
Pacific's right of way. This relocation of the road was not a minor deviation to avoid an 
obstacle on the road, but rather was a major relocation apparently done to suit the 
convenience of Geneva Steel. Thus, the proper procedures for the dedication of a public 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
highway must be followed before the current location of the road across Union Pacific's 
right of way can be considered a public crossing. 
The Commission found to the contrary that "the Crossing is public despite the 
reconfiguration." R. 962. It based this determination on case law that holds that a public 
highway, "once established/' does not cease to exist until it is formally abandoned, and 
on the fact that the public highway that was established before 1942 was never formally 
abandoned. R. 960-61. This reasoning misses one key step: the road that was built in the 
1970's was a completely new road, located, in part, on Union Pacific's private property, 
and neither the road nor the land was ever dedicated to public use. The cases cited by the 
Commission only support the rule that a public highway, once established, must be 
formally abandoned. They do not support the proposition that a public highway, once 
established, can be relocated freely across private land. 
The Commission cited two cases: Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 
(Utah 1997), and W. Kane Cnty. Spcl Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 
1376 (Utah 1987). Neither of these cases establishes a rule that would permit floating 
public rights of way. Neither the footnote in Heber City, which the Commission cites to 
support its conclusion, nor any other part of that case, stands for the proposition that a 
right of way is a floating right that can be relocated across private property at any time. 
See 942 P.2d at 313 n. 12. Rather, the Heber City court simply stated that long nonuse of 
an established public highway does not constitute abandonment of that highway, a 
statement of law that Union Pacific does not dispute. Id. 
i i 
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Similarly, in Kane County, the court held that a public right of way was not 
vacated simply because the road was moved away from the public's right of way and the 
right of way went unused for many years. 744 P.2d at 1377. The case does not support 
the Commission's legal conclusion that a public right of way can be freely moved and 
may absorb private property not encompassed by the original dedication. In fact, the 
Kane County case held that the county did not have power to take any land beyond the 
border of the ten-foot-wide public highway that had been dedicated to public use unless 
the county jfirst exercised its eminent domain powers and compensated the landholder for 
the property taken. Id at 1377-78. The court so held in spite of the fact that the county 
needed more land to establish a functional road. Id. 
No more can UDOT or the Town of Vineyard take Union Pacific's private land 
located outside the boundaries of the public crossing and right of way established before 
1942. While it is true that the public crossing was never vacated or abandoned, the 
current crossing is located on land that was never established as a public right of way. 
Neither UDOT nor the Town of Vineyard has jurisdiction over the crossing that exists 
today merely because a public crossing formerly existed to the south it. A public 
crossing may be established over private property only by following statutory procedures, 
or by condemning the land through eminent domain and fairly compensating the owner. 
Because neither of these procedures was followed to establish a public right of way at the 
current location of 400 North Street, the crossing at that location is private. 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
b. The crossing is private because the road that currently crosses 
Union Pacific's right of way was never dedicated for public use 
The highway-railroad grade crossing at issue in this case is private because the 
road that crosses Union Pacific's right of way has not been dedicated for public use. 
Section 72-5-104 of the Utah Code provides a mechanism whereby a highway may be 
dedicated to public use. For a particular section of road to become a public highway, it 
must be used continuously as a public thoroughfare for at least ten years. Okelberry, 
2008 UT 10, *f 9. "[Dedication of property to public use should not be lightly 
presumed." Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 448 (Utah 1981). Therefore, the party 
asserting a dedication has the burden of proving dedication by clear and convincing 
evidence. Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, fflf 11-12, 208 
P.3d 1077. The crossing currently located on Union Pacific's right of way at about 400 
North Street was not dedicated to public use because none of these three requirements 
was met. 
1. Dedication requires use as a public thoroughfare for ten years 
Three conditions are necessary to a conclusion that a thoroughfare is public. Dixie 
Riding Club, 2009 UT App ^ [ 11. There must be "(i) passing or travel, (ii) by the public, 
and (iii) without permission. Id. The party wishing to establish that a thoroughfare is 
public must demonstrate these facts through clear and convincing evidence sufficient to 
overcome the presumption in favor of the property owner. Id. 
Owners of adjoining property "cannot be considered members of the public 
generally . . . because adjoining owners may have documentary or prescriptive rights to 
n 
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use the road or their use may be by permission of the owners of the fee of the road.5' 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). Use of a road by 
persons invited by neighboring landowners is also not use by the public. Petersen v. 
Combe, 438 P.2d 545,547 (Utah 1968) (adjacent landowners and "their personal visitors 
cannot be numbered in the class of members of the general public using such road"); see 
also Dixie Riding Club, 2009 UT App 119, f 13. Specific evidence that the persons who 
used a road were not adjacent landowners or their invitees is required to demonstrate that 
the road was used by the public. See Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1100. 
The condition of use as a public thoroughfare can only be established through 
proof of use by the public. Petersen, 438 P.2d at 547. It cannot be established by a 
resolution made by a municipality declaring a road is public, a municipality's sincere 
belief that it is public, or the fact a road is listed as public in maps and charts, without any 
evidence that a condemnation, dedication, or sale actually took place. Id. Similarly, 
public use cannot be established through evidence that a municipal authority maintained 
the road at some point unless that maintenance conclusively proves ownership of the 
road. See id. at 548. 
For instance, in Petersen v. Combe, land developers attempted to establish that a 
private road was in fact public. 438 P.2d at 545. The developers were unable to present 
adequate evidence of public use of the road, and therefore also introduced several other 
tangential pieces of evidence. Id. at 547. These included a resolution by the county that 
stated that the road was a public road, an exhibit that showed that the County Surveyor's 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
office considered the road public, and some aerial maps and other charts that labeled the 
road as a public road. Id. The court rejected this evidence for two reasons. First, it 
refused to acknowledge the county's acceptance of the road as a public road as 
establishing a dedication, since there was no proof that the road had ever been dedicated, 
condemned, or sold. The court noted that if it were to hold that acceptance of a road by 
resolution constituted a dedication to public use, this holding would "condone by 
'Resolution' the establishment of a public highway . . . into and out of [private premises 
and parking lots]," essentially providing for the taking of property without a need to 
resort to eminent domain powers or statutory authority. Id. 
Second, the court refused to accept as evidence of dedication the fact the County 
Surveyor's office considered the road public, and the fact the road was labeled as public 
on various maps and charts. Id. The court said that this evidence all relied on 
"conjecture and prestidigitation," instead of on a sound legal basis. Id. In short, the only 
evidence sufficient to show that a road is a public thoroughfare is evidence that members 
of the public traveled on the road for the prescribed time period. See generally id. 
2. Dedication requires continuous use for ten years 
For a road to become a public highway it must be used continuously. Heber City 
Corp., 942 P.2d at 310. Continuous use is defined as use by the public "as often as they 
find it convenient or necessary." Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, If 10 (quotations omitted). 
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Continuous use should be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence through the 
testimony of disinterested witnesses "that the public generally . . . had used the road 
continuously for 10 years[.]" Petersen, 438 P.2d at 546-47. 
For example, in Petersen v. Combe, developers purchased land at the end of a 
private road and began building houses on it. Id. at 546. After the owners of the private 
road objected to this use of their road, the developer sued to have the road declared a 
public highway by dedication. Id. In support of this suit, the developer presented 
evidence that property owners abutting the road regularly used it, that some Greyhound 
Lines passengers may have traversed the road on a daily basis, and that a number of 
government agencies used the road to reach a reservoir, serve telephone facilities, control 
game, and care for forest service lands. Id. at 547. However, the court ruled that this 
evidence was insufficient to establish that the road had been continuously used by the 
public, particularly in the face of other evidence that the road dead-ended on a rocky, 
brushy area that "had no allure for the [general] public." Id. Given the scant evidence of 
continuous public use, or indeed any public use, the court held that the road could not be 
taken for public use unless it was first legally condemned and its owners fairly 
compensated. Id. at 548. 
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3. The road that crosses Union Pacific's right of way at 400 North 
Street has not been used as a public thoroughfare continuously 
for ten years 
In this case, the Commission found that there was a lack of evidence of public use 
of the crossing. R. 963-64 (when referring to the current placement of the road the 
Commission stated that "the Crossing remained dedicated for public use, even though it 
was not being used as such" (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, the Commission 
determined that the crossing was public "despite any reconfiguration, lack of 
maintenance or public use, or even the placement of barricades across the Crossing." R. 
960. Under Utah law, however, the crossing is not public precisely because there was no 
continuous public use for ten years. 
The road that crosses Union Pacific's right of way was used only by the owners of 
Geneva Steel and their employees and invitees from the date of construction in the 1970's 
until Geneva Steel closed. After Geneva Steel closed, the road was blocked off by a gate 
on the eastern side, unquestionably closing it to the public. R. 963-64. In 2005 the 
Anderson Entities acquired the property, and themselves maintained the gate across the 
road, which was still closed when this litigation began. Id. In short, from the date of 
construction, the relocated road was used, if at all, only for private purposes. Even if 
some members of the public crossed the road at some point, there is no evidence that the 
public used the road continuously for ten years. During the period when the road was 
17 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
passable, it led to Geneva Steel, a private steel plant not open to the public. 
Appellees attempted to satisfy the requirements for dedication by substituting 
evidence that the Town of Vineyard accepted the road as public, that the crossing 
appeared on Vineyard Town's master plan as a public crossing, and that the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) database listed the crossing as a public crossing until 
2009. But none of this evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the road was 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for ten years. The Town of Vineyard cannot 
make private property into public right of way simply by "accepting" it. Nor can it make 
the crossing public by labeling it as such on its master plan. Instead, it must follow 
proper constitutional procedures by exercising its eminent domain power to acquire the 
property, or by establishing that a statutory dedication did in fact occur. 
Similarly, the fact that the crossing was listed as public in the FRA database is not 
enough to make it so. Further, the Commission found that the FRA database was likely 
inaccurate, not intended to be consulted for a determination of legal rights, and concluded 
that "the fact that the database listed the Crossing as public would not alone present 
sufficiently reliable evidence of its character." R. 965-66. No evidence unrelated to 
continuous public use for the prescriptive period can substitute for evidence that the 
crossing, as currently located, was actually used by the public. 
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4. Union Pacific's right of way near 400 North Street remains 
private 
In conclusion, the evidence presented and factual findings of the Commission lead 
to the conclusion that the crossing is private. Appellees have not demonstrated by clear 
and convincing evidence that the relocated road, where it crosses Union Pacific's right of 
way, has been used by the public continuously for ten years. Because the Commission 
adopted an erroneous view of the law, it failed to correctly apply the dedication statute to 
the facts. The Commission's contrary determination should be reversed. 
c. The crossing is private and is not subject to UDOT's jurisdiction 
Only Union Pacific has the right to control the grade crossing located at about 400 
North Street in Vineyard, Utah. The road that currently crosses Union Pacific's right of 
way has not been used by the public continuously for a ten-year period. Therefore, the 
part of Union Pacific's right of way where the road is located has not been dedicated for 
public use under Utah law. That part of Union Pacific's right of way remains private 
property over which UDOT has no jurisdiction. UDOT "oversees all Public Highway-
Rail Grade Crossings . . . in the state of Utah. Railroads have jurisdiction over and are 
responsible for the safety of private crossings." Utah A.D.C. R930-5-l(l). UDOT 
cannot assert jurisdiction over this railroad crossing because it is located on Union 
Pacific's private right of way. To do so would exceed UDOT's statutory authority. The 
Commission's ruling to the contrary should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Union Pacific urges this Court to reverse the order of the Public Service 
Commission and declare that the crossing at issue is private for three reasons. First, a 
rule permitting a floating right of way that can be relocated on private property at any 
time is unsupported by law and contrary to public policy. Second, there is insufficient 
evidence to show that the part of the road that crosses Union Pacific's right of way was 
ever dedicated to public use. Finally, under Utah law, UDOT has no jurisdiction over 
this crossing. The crossing is located on private property owned by Union Pacific, and 
Union Pacific has authority to close the crossing without interference from UDOT. The 
order of the Commission should be reversed and this Court should rule that the crossing 
is private. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2012. 
'H^^^<— 
Reha Kamas 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Union Pacific Railroad Company 
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of Union Pacific Railroad's 
Petition for Relief against the Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT) 
DOCKET NO. 09-888-01 
REPORT AND ORDER 
ISSUED: February 7, 2011 
SYNOPSIS 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 54-4-15(4), the Commission finds that there is 
substantial evidence for UDOT's determination that the Crossing is a public crossing. The 
Commission further finds that UDOT failed to follow its own Rule in closing the Crossing, and 
such action was arbitrary and capricious. The Crossing shall be reopened and UDOT shall 
follow its Rules in determining whether the Crossing should be closed. 
BACKGROUND 
The Crossing 
This dispute concerns a railroad crossing where 400 North in Vineyard (a.k.a. 
Vineyard Road) crosses the Union Pacific Railroad Company (UPRR)1 right of way (ROW) 
(Crossing). The Crossing lies partly on, and adjacent to, property formerly owned by the Geneva 
Steel manufacturing plant, in what is now the Town of Vineyard, Utah County, Utah. Anderson 
Geneva, LLC, Ice Castle Retirement Fund, LLC, and Anderson Geneva Development, Inc. 
(Anderson Entities) now own and manage that property. Vineyard owns and maintains Vineyard 
Road. UPRR owns the ROW. 
The UPRR ROW runs generally in a north-south direction,2 about perpendicular 
to the 400 North road that runs generally from east to west3, from Utah Lake, across Geneva 
1
 There is no dispute that UPRR's predecessor, the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad (D&RGW), acquired 
the ROW by deed dated 1881 from a private property owner. 
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Road and to what is now State Street in Orem, Utah. See generally Union Pacific Railroad 
(UPRR) and Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) Joint Trial Exhibits 132-134. Part of 
Vineyard Road currently runs generally from south to north along the western boundary of the 
UPRR ROW and then veers west, following the section line towards Utah Lake. See e.g. Tr. 
Vol.2, p. 38, Anderson Entities Exhibits. 22, p.2 ('East Lake and Geneva Industrial Business 
Park "), UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibits 133-135. 
The 1942 Resolution 
There is no dispute that UPRR's predecessor, the Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad (D&RGW), acquired the ROW by deed dated 1881 from a private property 
owner. There is no deed making the Crossing a public road or crossing, and although it is 
unclear how 400 North first became an authorized public crossing of the UPRR ROW, 
Tr.Vol.2,p.20,4 there is no dispute that prior to August 3, 1942, the Crossing was conclusively a 
public road and a public crossing5—in addition to the portion of 400 North that ran east from the 
Crossing towards what is now the Orem State Street. On that date, the County Commissioners of 
Utah County (Utah County) passed a Resolution and Order (1942 Resolution) vacating portions 
of 400 North lying within the boundaries of the steel plant. Utah County gave title to property 
lying on the north and east sides of the Crossing to the Defense Plant Coiporation (a quasi-public 
corporation owned by the United States of America), for the purposes of constructing a steel 
3
 Id. 
4
 In any event, Mr. Barney stated recognized that the lack of a deed would likely have little bearing here, that such a 
fact would not be uncommon, and that public roads may come into being in various ways, including by public use. 
Tr. Vol.2, p242, 116-25, p.243, 111-15. 
5
 The parties stipulated to this fact See Tr. Vol. 1, p. 14, 11.7-12. (UPRR Counsel Mr. Pickett to Anderson Geneva 
Counsel Mr. Astill: Q:"I will ask counsel to correct me if I get this wrong, but I believe that the parties have 
stipulated that prior to the 1942 action by the county commissioners that we agree that this was a public road and a 
public crossing."" A: "Yes." 
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plant—what later became known as Geneva Steel. Although the public roads within the 
boundaries of the steel plant were vacated, the actual Crossing and 400 North from the eastern 
boundary of the ROW and running west, was not vacated as the following witnesses testified: 
• Kent Barney, a licensed surveyor employed by Northern Engineering6 testified that based 
on the "val" map7, see UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibit 132,134, the county road would not 
have been vacated by the 1942 Resolution. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 240-241; 
o 
• Jim Marshall, manager of special projects for UPRR , testified that Utah County 'Vacated 
everything on the east side of the [Union Pacific] right of way" Tr. Vol.1, p. 15, 111-15; 
• Jerry Grover, current site engineer for the Anderson Entities,9 testified that the 1942 
Resolution did not vacate the public crossing. Tr. Vol.2, p.338, 1114-23; 
• William Clark10 testified he plotted the 1942 Resolution, see UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibits 
134, and Tr. Vol.2, p.15, 11.8-23. He testified that the east boundary of the UPRR ROW 
was the edge of the 1942 Resolution vacation line, Tr. Vol.2, p. 70, 11.8-13, anything north 
of the section line11 was vacated, Id. at 11.14-17, and UPRR/UDOT Exhibit 134, and that 
anything south [of the section line] within the Railroad corridor and continuing to the 
west was not vacated. Id. at II. 18-21,p. 71, 111-II12; 
6
 Tr. Vol.2, p.229, 23-25. 
"A val map is a map that was created to show what the Railroad owns . . . and [] this map and dimensions were 
created to, to know what the Railroad owned. How much acreage they owned. ["Val"] stands for . . . evaluation." 
Tr. Vol.2,p.27, 1118-25, p.28, 11.1-6. See UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibit 132, Tr.VoU, p.28, 111-12. 
8
 Tr. Vol.1, pp. 11-12. 
9
 Mr. Grover is a licensed professional civil and structural engineer, formerly employed by Geneva Steel, and former 
Utah County Commissioner (with responsibility for road construction and railroad crossing in the County). Tr. 
Vol.II, p.336-337. 
10
 Mr. Clark is a licensed land surveyor with Psomas Engineering. Tr Vol.2. p. 5. 
11
 See Tr. Vol.2, p. 11-12, where Mr. Clark explains a "section line" 
12
 See also Tr. Vol.2, p.78,11.20-25. 
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• Mr. Clark also testified that the 1942 Resolution vacated lands within the steel plant, 
"excepting lands that run northerly and in a southerly direction and located west of said 
meander line and which road begins at the SW corner and terminates at the NW corner of 
the property first above described;" Tr. Vol.2, p.80-81; 
• Mr. Clark further testified regarding the specific location of the public road and crossing 
at the time of the 1942 Resolution. Mr. Clark, stated that the 1927 D&RGW val map 
filed with Utah County1 J showed the center line of the public road was at least 34.6 feet 
south from the vacating line established by the 1942 Resolution. Id. Clark said that for 
Utah County to have vacated any part of the public road that existed, the north half of the 
road would have needed to be at least 30 feet wide (the whole road needing to be 60 feet 
wide). Tr. Vol.2, p.87. Clark then testified that the 1927 D&RGW val map centerline of 
the Crossing located on the railroad was "incontrovertible." Tr. Vol.2,pp. 55-56. Clark 
further testified that the 1927 County road depiction on the val map shows the road as 
approximately 50 feet wide. Tr. Vol.2, p.40, which support the contention that the entire 
road was not vacated by the 1942 Resolution. 
Even after the 1942 Resolution, the Crossing was still recognized as public. No 
later than July 16, 1943, the Crossing was still recognized as public by a public entity, i.e. the 
Public Service Commission. UPRR's predecessor, D&RGW, applied to the Commission for 
permission to cross 400 North (what the application identified as a public highway) as it 
upgraded the railway. As the Commission noted in its findings, D&RGW itself recognized the 
400 North road crossing the ROW was an authorized public crossing, i.e. "a public highway." 
13
 See Tr. Vol.2, pp.57-60, UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibits 135, and Anderson Entities Exhibit 22. 
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See Tr. Vol. 2,p.364, 11.3-15, UPRR/UDOT Joint Trial Exhibits 75-76. Additionally, the State 
Road Commission, in a July 20, 1943, memorandum recognized the crossing as a public 
highway. Tr. Vol. 2,p.365, 11.15-25, p.366, p.367, 11 1-10. Later, UPRR itself petitioned the 
Commission for permission for a "line into Bunker feed on Geneva Road." Tr. Vol 2, p.368, 11.8-
9. Although the construction did not specifically deal with the 400 North crossing, the blueprints 
attached to the UPRR Amended Application identified the crossing as a public highway. Tr. Vol. 
2, p. 3 68-369; UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibits 85. Vineyard continues to accept the Crossing as 
public. 
Current Location of the Crossing and Public Road 
Despite the fact that the County never formally abandoned the Crossing, at least a 
portion of the Crossing and what is left of 400 North presently lie over the land vacated by the 
1942 Resolution. Tr. Vol.2, pp. 41-43, Tr. Vol.2, p.41, Tr.Vol.2, pp. 41-44, UPRR/UDOT Joint 
Exhibits 133-135. However, there are two possible explanations for the current placement of the 
public road and Crossing. The first explanation is that a reconfiguration placed the public road 
and Crossing where they are now. Sometime in the early 1970s, the angle and location of the 
Crossing was reconfigured, Tr. Vol J. p. 18, 11.7-13, p.35, p. 131, p. 132. Once the public road and 
Crossing were reconfigured, there were some changes in the road: 
• The original crossing angle was altered from something less than a 90 degree angle to 
"something closer to a 90-degree angle to the tracks", Tr. Vol.1, p.133, 11.20-23; 
• The road would come through the UPRR ROW but not completely reach the eastern 
boundary of the UPRR ROW14, Tr. Vol.2, pp. 41-43; Tr. Vol.2, p.ll 7, 11.19-22; 
The UPRR ROW and railroad corridor are essentially synonymous. Tr. Vol 2, p. 14. 
n n n o c 1 
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• The reconfiguration moved the road almost completely off the public ROW, Tr. Vol 2. 
p.41, and Crossing almost entirely off the ROW, Tr. Vol.2, pp. 41-44, UP RR/UDOT Joint 
Exhibits 133-135. 
The County was involved in discussions about reconfiguring the Crossing, as reflected in the 
minutes of the County Commissioners. See UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibits 158. The suggestion of 
moving the Crossing some 600 feet to the north never materialized, however. See Tr. Vol.1, 
p.35-36, p.134, 1121-25. Although, Mr. Marshall testified there is evidence the UPRR, the 
County, and the steel plant were involved in talks concerning the reconfiguration, Tr. Vol.1, p.23, 
11.13-25, he also admits he "cannot tell" if UDOT was involved, Tr. Voll, p.135, 11.1-3, nor 
whether the changes were made by the steel plant alone. Tr. Vol.1, p. 132. Although Mr. Marshall 
initially testified that the County Commissioner minutes do not indicate that the Crossing was 
public, Tr. Voll, p.23, 1119-25, he also admits that though the reconfiguration might make the 
Crossing safer, reconfiguration would not change "the usage" of the Crossing, i.e. would not 
change whether it is public or private. See Tr. Voll, p. 135, 118-20. There is not substantial 
evidence to find the County formally abandoned its ROW. with the configuration, even if it did 
participate in the reconfiguration. In fact, Mr. Marshall admitted that neither UPRR nor its 
predecessor, D&RGW, ever went through a process to close the public crossing or what 
remained of 400 North after the 1942 Resolution. Tr. Voll, p.95, II 24-25, p.96, 11.1-4. 
A second possible explanation for the current location of the public road and 
Crossing is the actual shifting of the road and Crossing. Some witnesses recognized that it would 
not be uncommon for the road to have shifted over 80 years or so. For example, Mr. Barney 
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stated that it would not be uncommon for a road to shift over time. Tr. Vol2, p.241, 11 24-25, 
p.242, 111-3. 
There is no conclusive evidence that the road-as it currently exists—is how it was 
at the time of the 1942 Resolution. See Tr. VoU, p.115, 112-9, see also Tr. VoU, p.113, 1117-25. 
But despite the lack of evidence showing precisely where the road actually was at the time of the 
1942 Resolution, witnesses agree the County did not abandon the Crossing or the road. See 
Tr.VoU,p.81, 1114-25, p.82, 11.1-14; Tr.VoU, p.339, 11.16-25, p.340,ll.l-16.]5 For example, Mr. 
Barney testified that he saw no evidence that the 1942 Resolution "would have vacated the 
public road that crossed over the Railroad right-of-way in this location" nor any evidence that the 
"public road crossing over into the north, north of the section line." Tr. Vol.2, p.240, 11.19-15, 
p.241, 111-8. Witnesses Clark and Grover agreed that the County would need the 400 North road 
remaining on the west side of the vacation line (and lying along the UPRR ROW) in order to 
maintain access to the lake, Tr. VoU, p.81, 1114-25, p.82, 111-14; Tr. VoU, p.339, 1116-25, 
p.340,111-16, and did not vacate the remaining portion of 400 North and the Crossing. 
Procedural Background 
In January 2009, the Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) Chief 
Railroad Engineer, Eric Cheng determined the Crossing was a private crossing. See Anderson 
Entities' Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts and Pre-hearing Position Brief, Exhibit 
14, ^6. The Anderson Entities and Vineyard complained to UDOT and UTA that the public 
notices issued regarding the Crossing were defective because they identified 4000 North in 
Vineyard, and not 400 North. See id. at 1ffl/-2. Nonetheless, UDOT continued to maintain the 
,:>
 See also background above, regarding the testimony of witnesses Barney, Marshall, Clark, and Grover, the 1942 
Resolution and preservation of the Crossing. 
rtnnntr * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DOCKET NO. 09-888-01 
- 8 -
Crossing was private. The Anderson Entities petitioned the Commission for relief16, while at the 
same time it and Vineyard attempted to present evidence to UDOT the Crossing was public. In a 
letter issued February 25, 2009, UDOT reversed its determination designating the Crossing as 
private and decided to conduct another surveillance review "based upon the Crossing being 
public because of the [Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)] inventory listing17 this crossing 
as public and Resolution and Order passed by the Utah County Board of County Commissioners 
in 1942. At this point, UDOT considers this crossing as public . . . ." See Anderson Entities' 
Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts and Pre-hearing Position Brief, Exhibit 15. 
Additionally, UDOT had reviewed the 1942 Resolution and found that, based in part on the 1942 
Resolution, the Crossing was public. See Tr. Vo.2, ^133, 111-22. Because UDOT reversed its 
first determination finding the Crossing was private, the Anderson Entities asked the 
Commission to dismiss the petition for relief in Docket No. 09-999-05. Thereafter, however, 
UDOT did not conduct a surveillance review as it stated it would in its February 25, 2009 letter, 
Tr. Vol.2.} p.134, 11.5-10. In a July 13, 2009 letter, UDOT also stated it would be closing the 
Crossing temporarily, stating the Crossing was unsafe. See Anderson Entities' Statement of 
Undisputed and Disputed Facts and Pre-hearing Position Brief Exhibit 16. It gave no basis 
for the temporary closure except to refer the parties to Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15. UDOT made a 
16
 This dispute initially commenced before the Commission in Docket No. 09-999-05, with the Anderson Entities 
bringing the petition for relief. 
17
 The FRA maintains a "data base . . . for the National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory Data File" to "provide 
information to Federal, State and local governments as well as the railroad industry for the improvement of safety at 
highway-rail crossings." See UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibits 17, 1ffl//> 1-2- xt *s essentially an inventory of highway-
rail crossings in the United States, with site-specific information pertaining to each crossing, including whether the 
crossing is private or public. See id. 
18
 Mr. Cheng stated: u[T]he city presented information of the [1942 Resolution]. And then we thought that this is a 
true document and it show it didn't vacate the, the crossing . . . We accept.. . the Vineyard City's presentations and 
we feel, okay, so we'll rule it as a public." 
A r\ r\ t-\ iw i 
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distinction between temporary and permanent closures, and stated that because the closing of the 
Crossing was only temporary, it did not need to follow Utah Admin. Code R.930-5-14. See e.g. 
UDOT Post-hearing Brief, % 3. It again stated it would conduct a surveillance review. See 
Anderson Entities' Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts and Pre-hearing Position Brief 
Exhibit 16. The Anderson Entities objected to the closure without the proper process per Utah 
Admin. Code R.930-5-7, -14. See id., Exhibit 17. On August 7, 2009, the Anderson Entities 
discovered that UDOT conducted a surveillance review not to reconsider the temporary closure, 
but to discuss the process for the closure. On August 12, 2009, UPRR filed its petition for relief 
against UDOT. UPRR asked the Commission to determine that UDOT improperly characterized 
the Crossing as public, that the Crossing be designated as private, and that the Crossing be 
ordered closed. See UPRR Petition for Relief, p. 3. 
This matter arose because of pending changes in the railroad crossings in 
connection with the Utah Transit Authority's Commuter Rail South project (FrontRunner). 
There is no dispute that as FrontRunner expands to Utah County, and runs through the Crossing 
and Vineyard Road, train traffic is expected to significantly increase, from 8-20 trains a day to 
60-66 trains per day. See e.g. UPRR Pre-hearing Position Statement, p. 3., and Anderson 
Entities' Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts and Pre-hearing Position Statement, p. 10, 
li 34. 
After a period of discovery and following continuances of the hearing date, the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Commission held a hearing on August 17-18, 2010. 
Reha Kamas and David M. Pickett represented UPRR. Renee Spooner, assistant attorney 
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general, represented UDOT. Dennis Astill represented the Anderson Entities. David Church 
represented Vineyard. 
UDOT'S DESIGNATION OF THE CROSSING 
Standard of Review 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) provides that "if a statute . . . 
permit[s] parties to any adjudicative proceeding19 to seek review of an order by the agency or by 
a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 30 days after 
issuance of the order . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-301(l)(a). Section 54-4-15(4) states 'The 
commission retains exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute upon petition by any 
person aggrieved by any action of the department (UDOT) pursuant to this section." Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-4-15(2). UDOT took action to alter or abolish a crossing, and in doing so determined 
the legal rights or other legal interests of the parties. UPRR filed its petition for relief with the 
Commission within 30 days of UDOT's July 13, 2009 letter finding the Crossing was public. 
Although UCA 54-4-15(4) does not explicitly contain the standard of review the 
Commission should use when reviewing UDOT's actions, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102 gives 
the Commission guidance. Although that section refers to how an appellate court decides 
whether to grant relief to a person seeking judicial review, the UAPA also states it is "applicable 
to every agency of the state" and agency "action that determines the legal rights, duties . . . or 
70 
other legal interests of an identifiable person . . . ." Utah Code Ann.63G-4~102(l)(a). As a 
19
 "'Adjudicative proceeding' means an agency action or proceeding described in Section 63G-4-102." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-4-103(l)(a). 
20
 A person includes a group of individuals, partnership, corporation, association, political subdivision, etc. UCA § 
63G-4-103(l)(g). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"superior agency"21, the provisions of the UAPA are applicable here and the Commission uses 
its provisions to guide its review. 
UDOT's Finding that the Crossing is Public 
UDOT's determination that the Crossing was public is a factual determination. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-303(4)(g) states: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced 
by any of the following: . . . the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
Therefore, the Commission must find that there is substantial evidence for 
UDOT's finding. See First Natl Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1990) (explaining that the "whole record" should be reviev/ed to determine whether the agency's 
action is "supported by substantial evidence"). 
UDOT is given the authority to 
determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, 
and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each 
crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street 
railroad by a railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a 
railroad or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or 
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types of 
traffic in the interest of public safety . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15(2). With this explicit grant of authority over railroad crossings of 
public roads or highways, UDOT has an implied grant of authority necessary to carry out its 
duties, that is, to determine whether a crossing is public or private in the first place. See Basin 
Flying Service v. Public Service Comm \ 531 P.2d 1303,1305 (Utah 1975) (holding that a 
71
 As defined in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-103(l)(j), a "superior agency" means "an agency required or authorized 
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"regulatory body which is created and derives its powers and duties from statute has no inherent 
regulatory powers, but only those which are expressly granted, or which are clearly implied as 
necessary to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it.") 
When detemiining whether a crossing is public or private UDOT is constrained in 
part by engineering standards. As to engineering standards, Mr. Cheng agreed that some of the 
engineering standards UDOT uses in making its determinations are: 1) the Highway-Rail 
Crossing Inventory Instructions and Procedures Manual (FRA Manual), UPRR/UDOT Joint 
Exhibits 16-69, Tr. Vol.2,p. 178,1124-25,p. 179,111-23; 2) Private Highway-Rail Grade Crossing 
Safety Research and Inquiry report (Report), UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibits 70-71, Tr. VoU, p. 179, 
11.24-25, p. 180, 111-8; and 3) the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highway (MUTCD), Tr.Vol.2, p.180, 119-12, See also Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-301. Mr. Cheng 
recognized that the "MUTCD and the FRA standards" were "engineering safety guidelines." 
Tr.Vol.2,p.l83, 113-14. 
Per the Report, "a crossing shall be classified as public if, and only if, the 
roadway is deemed a public road in accordance with 23 CFR Part 460.2" The MUTCD 
defines a public highway-rail grade crossing as any intersection between a public 
roadway and railroad. The roadway on either side of the crossing must be a 
public roadway and railroad. The roadway on either side of the crossing must be 
a public roadway, i.e. under the jurisdiction of, and maintained by, a public 
authority and open to the public travel. If either approach to a crossing does not 
qualify as a public roadway, then the crossing is typically classified as a private 
crossing. 
UPRR/UDOT Joint Exhibits 71. The FRA Manual defines a "public crossing" as 
The location where railroad tracks intersect a roadway which is part of the general 
system of public streets and highways, and is under the jurisdiction of and 
maintained by a public authority and open to the general traveling public 
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FRA Manual at 1-5. The CFR defines "maintenance" means "preservation of the entire 
highway, including surfaces, shoulders, roadsides, structures, and such traffic control devices as 
are necessary for its safe and efficient utilization." 23 CFEL §460.2(d). The FRA Manual also 
states: 
In general, a roadway across a railroad track for which both approaches are 
maintained by a public authority and which is open to the public is considered a 
'public' crossing. These are roadways that are part of the general system of 
public streets and highways. Some jurisdictions accept a crossing as "public' 
when only one approach is publicly maintained. If a public authority accepts a 
crossing as 'public', it is a public crossing. All others are considered 'private.' 
FRA Manual at 1-6. The FRA Manual further states: 
A private crossing is one that is on a private roadway which may connect to part 
of the general system of public streets and highways but is not maintained by a 
public authority. Usually, it is a crossing where the property on both sides or at 
least one side of the railroad tracks is private property. It may also be on a 
roadway that is publicly owned but which is either restricted or not intended for 
use by the general public. Private crossings are generally intended for the 
exclusive use of the adjoining property owner and the property owner's family, 
employees, agents, patrons, and invitees. Crossings are classified as private 
where the normal need or use is for residential, farm, recreation/cultural, 
industrial or commercial activities. 
FRA Manual at 1-7. 
If viewing these engineering standards alone without considering the 
statutory and other legal provisions governing abandonment of public thoroughfares, it 
would seem the Crossing would be private. For example, the Crossing would not meet 
the MUTCD's provision that either side of a crossing be a public roadway, given that 
only one side is public. Also, the FRA Manual reiterates that in order for the Crossing to 
be public, both approaches to the Crossing must be open to the public and also 
maintained by the County or some other public authority. When viewing these standards 
n n n Q ^ Q 
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and applying them to the Crossing and 400 North, it would tend to show the Crossing is 
private, as contended by UPRR. 
However, despite Mr. Cheng opining that the Crossing was private, when 
considering solely engineering standards, Tr.Vol.2. p. 181, 112-14, he also recognized that 
focusing solely on engineering standards would lead to a different conclusion than if one looked 
at the legal issues surrounding the Crossing. Tr. Vol.2, p. 194, 11.8-21. He recognized that there 
was an apparent conflict between the two when he said "the Railroad's evidence and the City's 
evidence are just conflicting. That's why we are all here arguing this . . . . So we just don't 
know. It just appears to be conflicting." Tr. VoU, p.193, 1124-25, p.194, 111-4. But Mr. Cheng 
agreed that UDOT is constrained not only by engineering standards, but also by state law 
governing the Crossing. Tr. VoU, p.193, 116-17,p.194, 11.13-21 n 
When viewing the law governing the abandonment of public crossings, and even 
the language of the applicable engineering standards, there is substantial evidence showing the 
Crossing is public. This is true despite any reconfiguration, lack of maintenance or public use, or 
even the placement of barricades across the Crossing. Vineyard and the Anderson Entities both 
cited to statutes and case law that plainly support the principle that: "all public highways, streets, 
or roads once established shall continue to be highways, streets ROW roads, until abandoned or 
vacated by order of a highway authority having jurisdiction or by other competent authority*" 
Utah Code. Ann. § 72-5-105(1) (emphasis added). As further cited by the Anderson Entities, a 
22
 The Commission recognizes Mr. Cheng, at the hearing, said UDOT determined the Crossing was public as a 
"compromise" between the parties' various interests, Tr. Vol.2, pp. 141-143, 161, seeming to suggest that no 
standards were used. This assertion, however, contradicts the Febmary 25, 2009 letter which UDOT issued wherein 
in explicitly stated its finding was based in part on the 1942 Resolution. Mr. Cheng, at the hearing, further reiterated 
that UDOT relied on the 1942 Resolution in making its determination, and not just a mere desire to compromise 
without regard to any evidence or standards. 
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"public highway can only be abandoned by an order of the county commissioners or other 
competent authority . . . ." Clark v. Erekson, 341 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1959) (citing to UCA § 27-
1-3 (1953), predecessor for UCA § 72-5-105 (2011)). "Section 72-5-105 plainly provides that a 
public highway remains a highway until the proper authorities order it 'abandoned or vacated.'" 
Culbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108. However the Crossing came to be a 
public crossing, the parties stipulated that by the time of the 1942 Resolution granting certain 
lands and roads to the steel plant, the Crossing was undoubtedly public, and likely had been since 
at least 1927. There is no dispute that since the 1942 Resolution, there has been no other formal 
vacation by any competent highway authority or by the County, or any other competent 
authority. There is also no evidence disputing that neither UPRR nor its predecessor, D&RGW, 
ever went through a process to close the public crossing or what remained of 400 North after the 
1942 Resolution. Further, witnesses Barney, Marshall, Clark, and Grover all agreed that the east 
side of the UPRR ROW was the edge of the vacation line, that the portion of the Crossing lying 
within the UPRR ROW was not vacated, and that the portion of 400 North lying on the west side 
of the UPRR ROW was not vacated. There is substantial evidence that the Crossing continues to 
be a public crossing. 
The Crossing is public despite the reconfiguration. In Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997), fn. 12, the Supreme Court reversed a district court's 
decision declaring that a public highway was not public. The high Court stated: "The fact that 
the road has not been used since 1989 does not change its status as a public highway. In Western 
Kane County Special Service District No, 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377-78 (Utah 
1987), we held that a highway which had been dedicated and abandoned to the public by the 
OilftflRI 
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public's use of it 'from 1919 until 1931, when the highway was relocated and public use of the . . 
. road stopped/ still maintained its status as a public highway though half a century had passed 
since the road was used by the public (emphasis added)." There is no dispute the Crossing and a 
portion of the 400 North were reconfigured sometime in the 1970s. There is insufficient 
evidence to detennine whether the County was involved in the reconfiguration or whether it was 
solely reconfigured by the steel plant and the UPRR. The evidence is also not clear as to the 
width of the 400 North road remaining after the 1942 Resolution. There is no doubt the road and 
Crossing, as they presently lie, are either entirely or partly within the land that was vacated. 
They lie almost completely off the public ROW. This relocation could have been a result of the 
reconfiguration or the road simply shifting over time. But even if the County had participated in 
the reconfiguration, its participation in the reconfiguration did not lead to abandonment or 
vacation without any formal order vacating the Crossing or the remainder of the road. Even if 
the road shifted over time, and then shifted a portion of the road and Crossing over the section 
line and within the area that was vacated, that change did not come as a result of a formal order 
of the County or other competent authority. Therefore, despite the fact the Crossing and portion 
of 400 North lie were reconfigured or shifted on the land previously abandoned, they were not 
abandoned or vacated originally by the 1942 Resolution, and were not abandoned or vacated by 
formal order thereafter. Therefore, its current placement has no effect on the legal nature of the 
Crossing today. UPRR's contention that the Crossing's "relocation away from the former public 
ROW" interrupted public use, UPRR Post-hearing Position Statement, p. 9, is not correct. Its 
citation to language in Wasatch County v Okelberry, that "an overt act that is intended by a 
property owner to interrupt the use of a road . . . restarts' the running of the required ten-year 
A n A Q £ 9 
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period under the Dedication Statute," Id. at % 6, applies to how a private owner interrupts a 
public thoroughfare from becoming such through dedication. It is not an exception to Section 
72-5-105 nor does it allow vacation or abandonment by any means other than formal vacation by 
a competent authority. Section 72-5-105 "make(s) no allowance for any other type of 
abandonment or vacation" except by order. Fries v. Martin, 2006 UT App 514, f 8. Our high 
Court has reiterated "the language of [section 72-5-105] to require strict compliance with 
statutory procedures to effect an abandonment or vacation of a public road by the government." 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, f 26 (emphasis added). 
Even assuming as true UPRR's evidence that there has been a lack of public use 
or maintenance by any authority, this would still not change the Crossing's public nature. 
"[Ujnder Utah law, [a public highway] could not cease to be held for public use by mere 
abandonment or nonuse because real property designated as public use can only cease to be such 
by formal vacation. . . ." Fries, 2006 UT App 514 at [^8. Therefore, property dedicated for 
public use is considered to be held for public use even if the county does not use it for that 
purpose, and the formal vacation rule applies. Even if there was no maintenance, that would not 
vacate or abandon the Crossing and remainder of 400 North. In Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 657 
P.2d 1268, 1270, even where public property was "never . . . developed as a road and remain[ed] 
essentially in its natural state, covered by trees and shrubs" (emphasis added), the Court still 
held that the property designated for public use was subject to the formal vacation rule and was 
not vacated absent formal order. The County could not have abandoned or vacated the Crossing 
or the remainder of 400 North simply by nonuse or by lack of maintenance, even assuming those 
facts are true. The Crossing remained dedicated for public use, even though it was not being used 
~ * / \ r% rf"* O 
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as such, and remains public until a competent authority abandons or vacates those public 
thoroughfares by formal order. 
The placement of jersey barricades, the gate and other barriers across the Crossing 
did not change its public nature. By placing those barriers over the Crossing, no party gained 
some kind of "adverse possession" of the Crossing and 400 North, nor "interrupted" its public 
nature. In Clark v. Erekson, 341 P.2d 424, (Utah 1959), the Court found that a private 
landowner, who had placed encroachments, which included buildings, fences, and trees, over a 
public thoroughfare for about thirty years, still acquired no rights overt the public thoroughfare. 
It explicitly stated that a "public highway can only be abandoned by an order of the county 
commissioners or other competent authority . . . ." Id. at 425-26. In fact, in Memmott v. 
Anderson, 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), the Court there even noted that the City's placement of a 
barricade across the road does not change the public status of the road absent a formal vacation 
or abandonment. The placement of barricades, fencing, or gates did not change the nature of the 
public thoroughfares in this matter. 
Finally, even if there is no evidence that the Crossing and ROW was deeded, but 
only made public through dedication, this does not change the nature of the Crossing. "The 
formal vacation rule applies regardless of whether property was actually used by the public or 
simply designated for public use in a particular dedication." Fries, 2006 UTApp at f 9. The 
Crossing is public and so are all public thoroughfares remaining after the 1942 Resolution. 
Though these pronouncements of statutory and case law might seem to conflict 
with engineering standards, as Mr. Cheng opined, they do not. The MUTCD and FRA Manual 
allow for such occurrences as this Crossing at issue. For example, the MUTCD states that if one 
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approach to a crossing is not a public roadway, it is "typically"—not always, classified as a 
private crossing. Additionally, the FRA Manual also allows for instances where both approaches 
to a crossing are not publicly maintained, by saying that "in general" these crossings are 
private—but again, not always. The FRA Manual also explicitly states that if a public authority 
accepts a crossing as public it is public. Here, the Commission accepted and found the Crossing 
was public in two separate proceedings involving the D&RGW and the UPRR as noted 
previously. The State Road Commission considered the Crossing as public in 1943. Finally, 
Vineyard considers the Crossing a public crossing. This result seemingly leaves the Crossing 
and what is left of 400 North as a bit of an oddity—a public thoroughfare that crosses into 
private property. Mr. Cheng admitted, however, that he was aware of at least one other crossing 
in Salt Lake County that extends into private property. Tr. Vol.2.pJ93. The engineering standards 
do recognize exceptions to even general guidelines. 
The Commission notes the FRA database inventory also listed the Crossing as a 
public at-grade crossing from about 1970 until 2009. Anderson Entities Exhibit 7. However, 
more than one witness testified about the mistakes made in private/public categorization, the 
piecemeal process for entering information in the database, allegations regarding lack of 
oversight for the input of information, and inaccuracies regularly contained in the database. See 
e.g. Tr.Vol.l,p.73-75, Tr.VoU, p.136, 11.6-25,
 P.137,p.l38,p.l64.24 In any case, Mr. Cheng 
admitted that the FRA database inventory was not to be consulted for a determination of legal 
rights. Ttr. Vol.2, p. 171,118-1L Therefore, without more certainty regarding the information 
~
J
 Vineyard adopted a Master Road Plan in 2008 shows the Crossing as part of Vineyard's roadway plan. See 
Anderson Entities' Exhibit 19. 
24
 In fact, Mr. Marshall said the FRA database inventory was only 50% accurate, while Mr. Cheng opined it was 5-
10% inaccurate. See Tr. VoU, p. 136. 
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listing the Crossing as public in the database, the fact that the database listed the Crossing 
public would not alone present sufficiently reliable evidence of its character. 
The Commission finds there is substantial evidence the Crossing is public, 
together with remaining portions of 400 North. 
UDOT'S CLOSING OF THE CROSSING 
Standard of Review 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-303(4)(h)(ii) states that the Commission may 
grant relief to the Anderson Entities and Vineyard if the Commission determines that 
UDOT's actions in closing the Crossing were "contrary to a rule of the agency." UDOT 
admits it did not follow its own rule in closing the crossing and in not providing a 
surveillance review. It claims it did not do so because the closing of the crossing was 
only temporary, and not permanent. It claims its interpretation of its Rule should be 
given deference and that the Closing remain closed. It argues that "requiring public 
notice for temporary closures would negatively impact UDOT's ability to perform 
maintenance or emergency work, and that any such "could not be performed until the 
notice was given . . . ." UDOT's Supplemental Post-hearing Brief, p.4. 
When UDOT is interpreting its own rule, the Commission grants UDOT's 
interpretation an intermediate standard of deference, Semeco Industries, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm yny 849 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting) (explaining the 
standards of review of agency actions under the UAPA scheme); see Cf. Bradshaw v. 
Wilkinson Water Co., 2004 UT 38, ^ 8,32 and Westside Dixon Assocs., LLC v Utah 
Power and Light Co., 2002 UT 31,1f 7, and accept UDOT's interpretation of its Rule so 
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long as the interpretation is "reasonable and rational." R.O.A. General, Inc. v. UDOT, 966 
P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1998). Administrative rules are interpreted like statutes, with the 
Commission focusing first on the plain language of the Rule. Sierra Club v. Air Quality 
Board, 2009 UT 76. UDOT cannot simply ignore the specific language of its Rule. 
R.O.A. General, Inc., 966 P.2d at 842 (holding that "administrative regulations are 
presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or followed by the agency to 
suit is own purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action."). If it 
declines to follow its Rule, it must demonstrate a reasonable and rational basis for the 
departure from its Rule. See Union Pacific R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1992). 
The Closure of the Crossing 
UDOT's enabling statutes authorize it to "close or restrict travel on a highway" 
under their jurisdiction due to construction, maintenance work, or emergency." Utah Code Ann. 
72-6-114. Additionally, UDOT is given the authority to 
determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, 
and the terms . . . operation, maintenance, use and protection . . . crossing of a 
public road . . . by a railroad or street railroad, . . . and to alter or abolish any 
such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types of traffic in the 
interest of public safety . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15(2). 
UDOT, like other regulatory agencies, is given authority to prescribe rules by 
which its enabling statutes will be implemented. In this case, UDOT had Utah Admin. Code 
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-102(7) 
000987 
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R930-5-7, and -14 in place26 to implement, in part, Utah Code Ann. § 72-6-114 and Utah Code 
Ann. §54-4-15. R930-5-7 states in part: 
The Department shall have a program for the identification of highway/railway 
crossings for improvement. Crossings may be identified for improvement upon 
recommendation from the diagnostic/surveillance review team or by formal 
finding of the department. . . . The Department shall consider all 
recommendations made by the team members, and input received from the public 
at large before issuing final orders for the improvement of grade crossings the 
Team reviews railroad crossings when requested by local agencies or when 
railroad traffic is proposed to significantly increase." 
The Rule also lists who comprises the diagnostic/surveillance review team. Utah Admin. 
CodeR930-5-7(2). 
Utah Admin. Code R930-5-14 deals with the closure of public crossings. 
It states in part: 
Public notification is required when the Department is considering proposal to 
close public streets at crossings . . . addition of tracks at crossings, or construction 
of new public at-grade crossings. The Department shall advertise a notice of its 
intended action in a newspaper of general circulation, and if available, a 
newspapers of local circulation in the area affected . . . . The notice shall identify 
the project, briefly describe the changes proposed, . . . and contain general 
information relating to the proposed action27 
The plain language of the Rule makes no explicit distinction between temporary and 
permanent closures. 
The Commission finds that UDOT failed to follow its Rules, failed to 
provide a reasonable and rational basis for its departure from its Rule, and must follow 
the procedures for closing the Crossing. UDOT claims that if the Commission were to 
26
 R930-5-14 was repealed after this dispute commenced. 
The Rule also states UDOT may waive the requirement for public notice. However, UDOT may only 
waive that requirement "provided all parties affected concur in writing with the action proposed." Parties 
affected include railroads, state, county city, boards or commissions, and "private persons or directly 
affected." [sic] There is no evidence of such a written agreement here. 
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not adopt UDOT's interpretation of its Rule, it would "negatively impact UDOT's 
ability" to close the Crossing for emergency purposes. This is incorrect. As pointed out 
by the Anderson Entities, UDOT has in place Rules governing emergency orders which 
would govern the emergency closing of this Crossing. That Rule, Utah Admin. Code 
R907-1-14, entitled "Emergency Orders", provides for specific factual bases for using 
such an order, limitations on scope, and provisions for the issuance of the order. If the 
proper prerequisites are met, that Rule allows UDOT to close the Crossing "without 
notice and hearing in accordance with applicable law." Utah Admin. Code R907-1-14. 
Therefore, UDOT's attempt to evade its Rule by establishing some exception to R907-1-
14, is improper and does not serve as a reasonable and rational basis to ignore the 
requirements of R930-5-7, and -14. 
UDOT further argues that if the Commission does not accept its interpretation, it 
would inhibit UDOT's ability to close the Crossing in cases of maintenance and construction. 
This is also incorrect. UDOT still has the ability to close Crossings or public thoroughfares if it 
finds the need, but must follow its own process for doing so. Rule R930-5-7 and -14—both 
drafted by UDOT, implement the method by which UDOT will close or improve crossings or 
other public thoroughfares. The plain language of the Rules make no distinction between 
temporary and permanent closure. The plain language of the Rule require certain actions by 
UDOT before closing the Crossing, temporarily or permanently. UDOT's own rules require it to 
take recommendations from the diagnostic/surveillance review team before issuing final orders 
for improvement, such as closing or removing a Crossing. It failed to implement this 
surveillance review team in this instance. It was required to take input from the public at large 
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before closing the Crossing. It failed to do so. This failure came because it failed to follow 
another Rule, requiring it to issue public notice of the Crossing. It incorrectly identified the 4000 
North crossing in Vineyard for closing, which is a non-existent crossing, instead of properly 
identifying the 400 North crossing in Vineyard. Its Rules require the diagnostic/surveillance 
team to review railroad crossings when requested by local agencies. Here Vineyard requested 
such a review, but no such review was conducted. Additionally, despite the fact that train traffic 
is expected to significantly increase with the addition of the FrontRunner project, UDOT failed 
to have a diagnostic/surveillance review team review the Crossing, gather information and 
reports, establish requirements, initiate appropriate action, obtain data, and issue orders as 
required by applicable Rules. See Utah Admin. Code R.930-5-7. Accordingly, the Commission 
finds UDOT must re-open the Crossing and follow the applicable Rules before making a 
decision on whether to close it. 
ORDER 
The Commission orders as follows: 
1. UDOT's characterization of the Crossing and remainder of 400 North as public is 
affirmed; 
2. UDOT shall re-open the Crossing and follow applicable Rules in determining 
whether it should close the Crossing; 
3. Pursuant to Sections 63G-4-301 and 54-7-15 of the Utah Code, an aggrieved party 
may request agency review or rehearing of this Order by filing a written request 
with the Commission within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Responses 
to a request for agency review or rehearing must be filed within 15 days of the 
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filing of the request for review or rehearing. If the Commission does not grant a 
request for review or rehearing within 20 days after the filing of the request, it is 
deemed denied. Judicial review of the Commission's final agency action may be 
obtained by filing a petition for review with the Utah Supreme Court within 30 
days after final agency action. Any petition for review must comply with the 
requirements of Sections 63G-4-401 and 63G-4-403 of the Utah Code and Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 7th da> ayid&February, 2011. A I 
Ruben H. Arredondo 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 7th day of February, 2011, as the Report and Order 
of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
Ted Boyer, ChairmadJ 
-^FZ&C-
Ron Allen, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
G#70952 
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I hereby certify that on this day, Monday, February 7, 2011,1 served a true copy of the hereto 
REPORT AND ORDER attached on the persons whose names are set forth below by mailing 
such copy on said date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly enclosed in a sealed 
envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the addresses shown: 
* See attached Mailing Lists and "E" Mailing Lists 
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Reha Kamas, #8487 
Union Pacific Railroad Company 
280 South 400 West, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 212-3985 
Facsimile: (801) 212-3978 
Attorneys for Union Pacific Railroad Company 
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RIC CAMPBELL J 
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SERVICE COMMISSION 
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Administrative Law Judfeft 
Ruben Arredondo^ 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the matter of Union Pacific Railroad's 
Petition for Relief against the Utah Department 
of Transportation 
Union Pacific Railroad Company's Petition 
for Rehearing and Stay 
Docket No. 09-888-01 
Pursuant to Sections 54-7-15 and 63-6-401 of the Utah Code, Union Pacific Railroad Co. 
("Union Pacific") seeks rehearing of the Report and Order of the Public Service Commission of 
Utah (the "Commission"), entered February 7,2011. 
A. i • uig 
Union Pacific seeks rehearing on the following two grounds: 
1. UDOT does not have jurisdiction over the Crossing because 400 North is not a 
"public road" at the point where it crosses the railroad tracks 
UDOT does not have jurisdiction over the Crossing at issue in this matter because 400 
North Street in Vineyard, Utah, is not a public road at the point where it crosses Union Pacific's 
tracks. The Commission ruled that, under Utah law, the Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT") has "an explicit grant of authority over railroad crossings of public roads or highways 
" Feb. 7, 2011, Rep. & Order at 11 (emphasis added). Section 54-5-15(2) provides, with 
emphasis, that 
000980 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The department shall have the power to determine and prescribe 
the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the 
terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of 
each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, 
and of a street railroad by a railroad and of each crossing of a 
public road or highway by a railroad or street railroad, and of a 
street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or abolish any such 
crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types of 
traffic in the interest of public safety. . . . 
Accordingly, for UDOT to have jurisdiction, a road must cross railroad tracks, and the road must 
be a public road, meaning, it must be located on public right of way. 
In this case, the road—400 North—is no longer located on public right of way. The 
Commission ruled that 400 North, at the point where it crosses Union Pacific's tracks, is located 
only partially on public right of way, if at all. The Commission ruled: "There is no doubt the 
road and Crossing, as they presently lie, are either entirely or partly within the land that was 
vacated. They lie almost completely off the public ROW." Feb. 7,2011, Rep. & Order at 16 
(emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the Commission ruled that, "despite the fact the Crossing 
and portion of 400 North . . . were reconfigured or shifted on the land previously abandoned, they 
were not abandoned or vacated originally by the 1942 Resolution, and were not abandoned or 
vacated by formal order thereafter. Therefore, its current placement has no effect on the legal 
nature of the Crossing today." Id. at 16. 
To the contrary, the current placement of 400 North determines whether UDOT has 
jurisdiction over the Crossing. The Commission ultimately ruled that "[t]he Crossing is public 
and so are all public thoroughfares remaining after the 1942 Resolution." Id. at 18. However, 
because it was relocated, 400 North is not one of the "thoroughfares remaining after the 1942 
OflflQfil 
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Resolution." UDOT's jurisdiction is limited to public roads. Therefore, UDOT does not have 
jurisdiction over 400 North at the point where it crosses Union Pacific's tracks. 
Union Pacific urges the Commission to grant rehearing to reconsider UDOT's statutory 
grant of authority as applied in this case in light of the Commission's finding that "[t]here is no 
doubt the road and Crossing, as they presently lie, are either entirely or partly within the land that 
was vacated. They lie almost completely off the public ROW." Id. at 16 (emphasis in original). 
2. A public thoroughfare that crosses into private property should be considered a 
private crossing 
The Crossing leads into property that has been private since 1942 and, therefore, should 
be considered private. The Commission ruled that "the Crossing and what is left of 400 North 
[i]s a bit of an oddity—a pubic thoroughfare that crosses into private property." Feb. 7, 2011, 
Rep. & Order at 19. Relying on Utah law holding that real property designated for public use can 
only cease to be such by formal vacation, the Commission ruled that the Crossing is public. Id. 
at 20. However, the absence of a formal abandonment or vacation should not be given such 
decisive weight. Even if 400 North were a public thoroughfare, the Crossing still should be 
considered private. Union Pacific urges the Commission to grant rehearing to reconsider the 
proper weight to be given the absence of a formal order of abandonment or vacation in light of 
the many other relevant factors, including the factor that led the Commission to rule that, "[i]f 
viewing these engineering standards alone without considering the statutory and other legal 
provisions governing abandonment of public thoroughfares, it would seem the Crossing would 
be private." Id. at 13. 
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B. Stay pending final agency action 
Pursuant to Section 63G-4-405 of the Utah Code, Union Pacific petitions the agency to 
grant a stay of its February 7,2011, Order pending agency review and any subsequent judicial 
review. A stay is necessary to prevent substantial improvements from being constructed and 
installed at the Crossing at UDOT's insistence when the Commission or a court may yet 
determine that UDOT does not have jurisdiction over the Crossing. 
UDOT held a surveillance review of the Crossing on February 22, 2011. Then, on 
February 28,2011, UDOT issued a Surveillance Report and Ruling directed to Utah Transit 
Authority. A true and correct copy of the February 28,2011, Surveillance Report and Ruling is 
attached as Exhibit A. In its Ruling, UDOT ordered temporary closure of the Crossing until 
improvements are installed and constructed. Ex. A at 2. UDOT outlined substantial and costly 
improvements to be installed and constructed, and design work has begun. 
Specifically, UDOT ruled that Vineyard Road must be realigned to the west because of 
safety concerns. Id. This will require road improvements on both the east and west sides of the 
Crossing. Id. Railroad lights, gates, and crossing panels are to be installed to match the new 
road alignment and improvements. Id. at 3. Standard railroad signage must be placed. Id. 
UDOT has ruled that UTA is responsible for installation of crossing panels, safety 
improvements, and signs. Id. However, UDOT has ruled that Union Pacific is responsible for 
the reinstallation of the east road approach to the Crossing. Id. 
o n A n o i 
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To prevent possibly unnecessary installation and construction of these improvements at 
the Crossing, Union Pacific urges the Commission to stay the February 7, 2011, Report and 
Order pending rehearing and possible subsequent judicial review. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2011. 
> ^ 
Reha Kamas 
Attorney for Union Pacific 
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Counsel for Town of Vineyard 
Bruce Jones 
UTA 
3600 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119-4122 
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State of Utah 
GARY K, HERBERT 
Governor 
GREG BELL 
Lieutenant Governor 
&Kl^ft~ 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
JOHNR. NJ0RD.P.E. 
Executive Director 
CARLOS M. BRACERAS, PE. 
Deputy Director 
February 28,2011 
MattCarter 
Utah Transit Authority 
669 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Subject: Surveillance Report and Ruling 
400 North, Vineyard: USDOT 254-903N 
Dear Mr. Carter: 
In accordance with Utah Administrative Rule R930-5, a highway railroad grade crossing 
surveillance review was conducted on February 22, 2011 for the above public at-grade crossing 
in Vineyard, Utah. 
Review I earn: 
Eric Cheng, UDOT; Renee Spooner, UDOT; Randy Famsworth, Vineyard (Mayor); Don 
Overson, Vineyard (City Engineer); Jim Marshall, UPRR.; Bill Ince, UPRR; Reha Kamas, 
UPRR; Tyson Payne, UPRR; Jason Bleyl, UTA; Matt Carter, UTA; Matt Wildauer, 
Parsons/UTA; Travis Baxter, UTA; Ed Grampp, Anderson Geneva; Dennis Astill, Anderson 
Geneva; Jerry Grover, AGDI; Scott Hendricks, RB&G; Brett Paxton, HNTB; Travis Colledge, 
HNTB. 
Existing Background Information: 
The Crossing at 400 North in the Town of Vineyard historically was access for the 
former Geneva Steel site. The Geneva Steel site was sold and the current property owners 
elected to close the eastern leg of the access road with a fence and gate to allow authorized 
vehicle access only. The Town of Vineyard has since adopted a master road plan that shows 
an upgraded collector roadway across the crossing at 400 North and through the property site 
to the East. 
The Utah Transit Authority (UTA) is constructing and plans to operate a commuter rail 
system from Salt Lake City to Provo. The rail line shares a coixidor with the existing Union 
Pacific Railroad (UPRR) tracks and at this crossing UTA has added a main line track on the 
west side of the railroad conidor. Cvtrrent freight traffic on the UPRR mainline is 8-20 trains 
per day. Proposed commuter rail traffic is estimated to be approximately 60 trains per day. 
Train speed through this location is planned to be 70 mph for the commuter rail line. 
Calvin L. Rampton Complex, 4501 South 2700 West, Sail Lake City, Utah 84119-5998 
telephone 801 -965-4000 • facsimile 801 -965-4338 * www.udot.utah.gov 
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The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) is charged with authority and oversight 
over public at-grade crossings. Part of the Department's responsibility is to review highway-
rail crossings and ensure that they operate safely for all parties that utilize them. 
Due to the current road alignment geometry of 400 North, coupled with the addition of 
the commuter rail tracks to the West of the corridor, and current limited need for access to the 
private parcel to the East, UDOT had issued a temporary closure order to restrict access over 
what was deemed an un-safe crossing due to the existing geometric conditions. Because of the 
addition of UTA's tracks, the lights and gates were removed and no active safety devices are 
currently present at the crossing, UDOT finds that the crossing is unsafe because of the locked 
gate on east side of the crossing, lack of safety devices and the existing geometric conditions of 
the road alignment on the west side of the tracks. Based upon these current conditions, the 
crossing is ordered to be temporarily closed until the crossing improvements are installed and 
constructed. 
The purpose of this surveillance review was to examine the current conditions of the 
roadway alignment and crossing configuration, receive stakeholder input as to preferred 
treatment of the crossing, identify what the future plans for the crossing consist of, and what 
measures need to be in place in order to reopen the crossing in a safe interim condition for the 
travelling public. 
General Crossing Improvements: 
1. The representatives from the Town of Vineyard requested that the crossing 
improvements be designed according to current conditions prior to the temporary closure 
and construction by UTA. The current conditions consist of the two lane paved road 
crossing the tracks with lights, gates and panels. Also, no city street exists on the east 
side of the tracks. 
2. The parties agreed that Vineyard Road needs to be re-aligned because of the 
safety concerns. Road improvements on both sides of the approaches shall be in 
conformance to the Town of Vineyard standards and specifications. Design of road 
realignment on the west side of the crossing will be approved by Vineyard for road 
improvements and UDOT for safety components. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 54-4-15.3, UDOT apportions 100% of the 
cost of the installing the lights, gates and crossing surface and other signaling equipment 
needed to operate lights and gates for the at-grade crossing required in this order to UTA. 
Specific Crossing Improvements: 
1. A substandard existing crossing has now been made unsafe by the addition of the 
mainline track by UTA. Consequently, the road has to be realigned to allow for 
minimum acceptable safety standards. Vineyard Road near the crossing will need to be 
realigned to the West in order to provide a minimum distance between the East edge of 
the roadway (Vineyard Road) and to the nearest gate arm to provide storage length for at 
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least two passenger vehicles that don't obstruct the traffic going north to west along 400 
North. See American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO) Geometric Design of Highways and Streets -2004 page 731 which addresses 
the case when highways are parallel to crossings. 
2. Standard railroad lights, gates and crossing panels shall be installed at the 
crossing to match the re-aligned lane configuration as indicated by the Town of Vineyard. 
Standard railroad crossing signage shall be placed in accordance with the MUTCD and 
the UDOT Standard Drawing ST-7. UDOT Railroad Engineer shall review safety design 
plans prior to installation of device installation. UTA shall be responsible for these 
installations. 
3. Road improvements on the east side of the crossing shall consist of a (2) lane 
paved roadway with a 120' diameter paved "knuckle" turn-around in accordance to 
Vineyard standards and approved by UDOT. The road improvement and future 
maintenance should be in consideration of meeting the driving public's 
perception/expectation as a public roadway. Vineyard has concurred they will be 
responsible to improve the east side of the road outside UPRR track. UPRR shall put the 
road approach that was taken out on the eastern most UPRR back in based upon the 
existing conditions of the approach. 
4. If a Quiet Zone is going to be implemented in this area, standard raised 18" non-
mountable concrete medians will need to be placed on both sides of the crossing. This 
feature would be used as a supplemental safety measure (SSM) for a quiet zone and 
would require Vineyard Road geometry to be realigned to the west to accommodate the 
placement of the median island. UDOT asks that if these additional items are required 
for the west approach based on the desire for a quiet zone that Vineyard and UTA work 
towards an equitable solution. 
5. This crossing is to remain temporarily closed until all the recommended safety 
improvement have been completed and accepted by UDOT. 
Short Term Action Items: 
1. Vineyard will provide proposed roadway sections and widths to IJ FA within one 
week of the surveillance review. 
2. Upon receiving the proposed roadway sections from the Town of Vineyard, UTA 
will generate possible design configuration concepts and scenarios and distribute to 
UDOT, UPRR and the Town of Vineyard for review within two weeks. 
3. UDOT will approve proposed design concepts and safety devices or recommend 
revisions as needed. 
If you have any questions regarding this Report and Ruling, please fee \u to contact me 
at 801-965-4284. 
000988 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sincerely, 
<3hic Cheng, P. E. 
Chief Railroad Engineer 
Cc: Renee Spooner, UDOT; 
Randy Famsworth, Vineyard (Mayor); 
Don Overson, Vineyard; 
Jim Marshall, UPRR; 
Reha Karnas, UPRR; 
Jason Bleyl, UTA; 
Matt Wildauer, UTA; 
Ed Grampp, Anderson Geneva; 
Dennis Astill, Anderson Geneva; 
Travis Colledge, HNTB/UDOT. 
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